The paper uses an endogenous switching regression model to measure the impact of participation in micro-irrigation development on households' welfare. The model takes into account selection bias associated with programme participation and endogeneity problems often encountered in most programme evaluations. A total of 482 households (195 irrigation users and 287 non-users) were used to generate all the necessary variables. To capture the impact of the irrigation on household welfare, variables: income by 8.8 per cent and asset formation by 186 per cent as compared to non-users. This shows how important applied and results were found consistent, both qualitatively and quantitatively.
Introduction
Ethiopia, despite achieving economic growth continuously in excess of 10 per cent per annum in the last decade, is one of the poorest countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Poverty is widespread and deep-rooted and constitutes the development priority of the country. About 30 per cent of the population lives below the poverty line (set at USD 1.25 per person per day) (WB, 2013) . The challenges that Ethiopia face, in terms of poverty and food insecurity, are associated with both inadequate food production and natural crop failure due to erratic rainfall (Awulachew et al., 2007) .
In a study conducted to assess the impact of climate change on production at sub-national level for SSA, Liu et al Rwanda as future drought hotspots. However, less than 4 per cent of renewable water resources in Africa are withdrawn for agriculture. To reverse the current underdeveloped nature of irrigated agriculture in SSA, there is a strong theoretical argument for expanding small-scale irrigation schemes to increase agricultural production in support of economic development and the attainment of food security in the region (de Fraiture and Giordano, 2014) . In Ethiopia, special focus has been given since 2003 to household-level water harvesting schemes such as ponds, deep and shallow wells, and river diversions, as an integral part of programmes aimed at breaking the cycle of food insecurity. The aim is to make water available to supplement rainfed agriculture through small-scale irrigation during the critical stage of plant growth when rainfall is inadequate (Hagos et al., 2006) .
The economic literature on adoption of agricultural technologies (including irrigation) uses various household, farm, social and economic variables to explain the level as well as the intensity of adoption and the impact of these technologies on adopters' welfare. In general it has been found that (a) an increase in the price or cost of technology reduces a farmer's likelihood to adopt (Caswell and Zilberman, 1985; Feder et al., 1985) ; (b) households with larger farms are more likely to adopt (Feder, 1980; Rahm and Huffman, 1984; Putler and Zilberman, 1988) ; (c) an adopter's human capital endowment variables such as age, gender, education and experience affects the likelihood to adopt (Huffman, 1977; Rahm and Huffman, 1984; Putler and Zilberman, 1988) ; (d) social capital (membership of social networks) and institutional capital (access to institutional services such as credit and extension service) are also likely to induce farmers to take some risks and adopt technologies.
Several studies have been conducted to assess the impact on household welfare after the adoption of new technologies, including irrigation. In India, access to irrigation has had a positive impact on poverty reduction (Fan et al., 1999; Narayanamoorthy, 2001; Shah and Singh, 2002) . Gebregziabher et al. (2012) found that, in terms of their technical while rainfed farms were on a lower production frontier with that irrigation enabled households to improve crop productivity so that they can grow high-value crops that generate higher incomes and employment as well as a higher implicit wage rate for family labour. A comparison between irrigators and non-irrigators in China showed that irrigation contributed to increased yields for almost all crops and higher income for farmers in all areas (Huang et al., 2006) . Dillon (2011) , using a panel from northern Mali houseto irrigation on household consumption, assets and informal insurance as outcome indicators. Access to irrigation increased household consumption by 27-30 per cent relative to water-recession and rainfed cultivators. Hagos et al. (2012) , using 1,517 sample households drawn from four regional states of Ethiopia, reported that access to selectedcant effect on poverty reduction. However, despite the data richness in terms of sample size and geographical represenaddress the selection bias that could arise between the adoption decision and the outcome equation. Using a household data set from the Tigray region in northern Ethiopia, similar results were reported by Gebregziabher et al. (2009) . Lipton et al. (2003) documented the various ways in which the -gators and non-irrigators. These included increased production and income, reduced risk and application of agricultural Bhattarai et al. (2002) could not establish a straightforward relationship between irrigation and poverty alleviation in selected Asian countries. Similar results were echoed by Berhanu and Pender (2002) who showed the limited impact of irrigation development on input use and farm productivity. Using time series data, Jin et al link between irrigation and total factor productivity growth in Ghana, Burkina Faso and Niger on whether government support for different water management systems has any impact on rice productivity, Katic et al. (2013) showed that -the nature of the selection problem, if the technology adopters are from the already better off community, the impact will be upward bias, and vice versa. Most of these studies have relied on income and/or not address the selection bias problem between the adoption process and the second stage outcome equation. In this paper, we assess the impact of the micro-irrigation 1 on household welfare in the Tigray region of northern Ethiopia. We endeavour to address the self-selection bias by using a relatively more robust model and, to address the measurement error, we tried to use alternative welfare indicators, the welfare implication of irrigation adoption.
Methodology

Study area
The study was conducted in three districts of the Tigray region. The climate of Tigray is broadly arid and semi-arid, with around nine or ten dry months and rainfall concentrated during July and August. Most parts of the region experience very erratic and inadequate rainfall (even during the two rainy months) that is precarious for crop production (Hagos et al., 2006) . Moreover, the region encounters severe during 'normal' rainy seasons (i.e. when drought does not occur) the region has an annual runoff of around 9 billion 1 Micro-irrigation is the slow application of water on, above, or below the soil by surface drip, subsurface drip, bubbler and micro-sprinkler systems. Water is applied as discrete or continuous drips, tiny streams or miniature spray through emitters or applica et al., 2007) . m 3 and can irrigate its potential irrigable area of 300,000 ha (Awulachew et al., 2007) . However, the developed irrigable land of the region currently does not exceed 75,000 ha. The three districts used in this study were selected because they are known to have both rainfed farming and micro-irrigation schemes such as ponds, wells and river diversions. Moreover, these districts have irrigation users and non-users sharing the same natural and agro-climatic conditions. Except for some small areas which practice dry season cultivation using micro-irrigation, rainfed agriculture predominates which involves the cultivation of wheat, teff (Eragrostis tef ), maize, oilseeds and pulses. Both exotic and indigenous vegetables and crops are irrigated and these include onions, tomatoes, pepper, garlic and maize.
Study design and data
A survey of 482 farmers comprising 287 non-users and 195 users of the different irrigation schemes was conducted in March 2012. In obtaining the sample for the survey, a multistage sampling technique was used. Firstly, three districts with good distribution of different irrigation schemes were were randomly selected. Thirdly, using extension workers' groups, namely irrigators (river diversion, wells and ponds) and non-irrigators (rainfed farmers). A questionnaire was used to gather data on households' income and asset holdings, household characteristics, and farm characteristics from both users and non-users, and sub-district level information.
Microeconomic evaluations of the impact of an inter-(household welfare) were based on the model developed by Becker (1964) and Mincer (1974) . However, the decision to adopt new technology, in our case, irrigation scheme, is voluntary; the familiar problem of sample selection bias may result: farmers who use irrigation are also likely to be the For example, farmers who are more wealthy and productive are more likely to be those who use irrigation. Hence, the self-selection into irrigation scheme utilisation would be the source of endogeneity, and failure to account for this will overstate the true impact of irrigation (Alene and Manyong, 2007) . Lee (1978) developed an approach for estimating models of this type which he called endogenous switching regression (ESR). In this approach, the decision is modelled by standard limited dependent variable models, and the second stage outcome variables are then estimated separately for each group (irrigation users and non-users), conditional on having made the decision. Let the decision to use one of the micro-irrigation schemes be a dichotomous choice, where a farmer decides to have irrigation when there is a positive perceived difference between using the scheme and not having the scheme.
Let this difference be denoted as I * so that I * > 0 corre-of not using the scheme, and it is under this condition that the farmer decides to use the scheme. However, I * is not observable; what is observed is I, which represents the observed farmer's decision choice. The expected utility of having an irrigation scheme, (adopters or regime 1) compared to the utility of not having, (non-adopters or regime 2), and the decision to own irrigation occurs if . Based on Lok-
where Z is a vector of explanatory variables (which includes household and farm characteristics; social and institutional variables); is a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated; and U i is a random error term and factors not observed by the researcher but known to the household, with mean zero and variance (Alene and Manyong, 2007 I (to have an irrigation scheme) is endogenous, OLS estimates in equations (2) and (3) will suffer from sample selection bias, namely the error terms in equations (2) and (3), conditional on the sample selection criteria, have non-zero expected values (Lee, 1978; Maddala, 1983; Fuglie and Bosch, 1995) . Lee (1978) treats sample selection as a missing-variable problem. For -dition, Z i contained one variable (whether household has a neighbour/s or not) not in X i so as to impose an exclusion restriction on equations (2) and (3). Having a neighbour who adopts any modern technology may help fellow farmers to eventually adopt the technology; thus technology diffusion will continue. In our situation, the presence of a neighbour who adopts one of the irrigation schemes is expected to affect the decision to adopt or not, but not the welfare status (income and asset holdings of a household). Hence, the IrrigationUserN neighbour adopter variable is used as an instrumental variable. In developing countries, social networks such as neighbours, friends and families are the technology or new practice adoption. Hence, the existence of -ence peer fellow neighbours to adopt one of the irrigation schemes, but not the income and asset holdings of households. Moreover, OLS estimates do not explicitly account for potential production function differences between households with irrigation and rainfed farmers. Hence, the variable whether a household has a neighbour/s or not is used as , and U i Y 2 and Y 1 are never observed maximum likelihood is used to estimate , it is estimable only up to a scalar factor and hence it can be assumed that (Maddala, 1983) . Given the assumption with respect to the distribution of the disturbance terms, the logarithmic likelihood function for the system of (2 and 3) is:
where F is a cumulative normal distribution function, f is a normal density function, w i is an optimal weight for observation i and After estimating the model's parameters, the following conditional (the focus of analysis) and unconditional expectations could be calculated:
Unconditional expectations:
Conditional expectations:
Given the above formulation, the following can be calculated and compared:
• The effect of adoption on adopters (treatment effect on the treated -TT ) as the difference between equations (8) and (10), which represents the effect of having irrigation on the two welfare indicators:
• The effect of adoption on non-adopters (treatment on the untreated -TU ) as the difference between equations (11) and (9):
(13)
• The policy-relevant treatment effects can also be differentiated from the heterogeneity effect. For example, farm households that adopted micro-irrigation may have achieved a higher level of welfare (measured by the selected two welfare indicators) than farm households that did not adopt although they decided to adopt; because of unobservable characteristics such as their risk-taking behaviour. Following Carter and Milon (2005) , 'the effect of base heterogeneity' (BH N that decided to adopt as the difference between equations (8) and (9): (14) • The second type of base heterogeneity (BH 2 ) can be calculated for the group of farm households that decided not to adopt as the difference between equations (10) and (11): (15) • The third type of heterogeneity is the 'transitional heterogeneity' (TH ), that is whether the impact of having micro-irrigation is larger or smaller for the farm households that owned or for the farm household that did not own in the counterfactual case that they did own, that is the difference between equations (12) and (13), i.e. (TT ) minus (TU ):
The switching regression model accounts for both endogeneity of technology adoption and possible sample selection, and allows the different household and farm characteristic variables to play differential roles, both in terms of qualitative and quantitative effects on the respective varietal technologies (Fuglie and Bosch 1995; Alene and Manyong, 2007) . To our knowledge, no study has explicitly accounted for underlying technological differences among farmers in assessing the effects of irrigation on the impact of household welfare.
Results and discussion
Descriptive results
Seventy-nine per cent of irrigator households are headed by males, compared to 71 per cent of non-irrigators (Table 1) . In terms of literacy status, 32 per cent of irrigator household heads are literate compared to 26.7 per cent of non-irrigators. On average, irrigation adopters have a 9 per cent bigger family size than non-adopters. The overall picture indicates that the irrigators have better quality and quantity of labour that might have helped them to engage in labour and capitalintensive activities.
Non-users are located far away from a development -ious social networks where they can get information, which might have helped them to use the irrigation service. There irrigators in credit utilisation. Approximately 63 per cent of irrigators had applied for credit and 58 per cent of them had non-irrigators were 57 per cent and 51 per cent respectively. On average, irrigators had a 25 per cent larger plot size than non-irrigators, suggesting a clear wealth difference.
two groups with respect to household income and total asset holdings. The per capita asset holding was about ETB 2 621 for irrigators, whereas for non-irrigators it was approximately ETB 361. The mean per capita consumption expenditure for irrigators was ETB 1,880 per annum, while the correspondcapita income of households using irrigation was ETB 1,473, which was approximately 37 per cent higher than that of nonirrigators. On other hand, non-irrigators had higher off-farm participation (97 per cent) than irrigators (95 per cent). With regard to off-farm income, irrigators derive slightly higher income (ETB 2,360) than non-irrigators (ETB 2,069) 3 .
Econometric results
Factors affecting adoption of irrigation
The adoption of an irrigation scheme and its outcome for household welfare in terms of household income and asset formation can be modelled as a two-stage framework. In estimated using probit and, in the second stage, the household welfare outcome was estimated with equations using different models. The model diagnostic statistics (Table 2) tests show that the parameter estimates are statistically sig--the cases; and the pseudo R-squared measure of 0.70 is also reasonably high, given the cross-sectional nature of our data. The analysis of the probit regression shows that seven them have the expected sign, except adult labour force, due to its high correlation with family size, and cost of irrigation, variables include: neighbour irrigation user (IrrigationUserN), credit constraint (tryloan), head age (lnHeadage), family size (lnFamily_size), cost of irrigation scheme, and number of visits by extension agent (Number_visits_EA). The parameter estimates of the probit model provide only the direction of the effect of the independent variables on the dependent (response) variable: estimates do not represent the actual magnitude of change or probabilities. Thus, the marginal effects from the probit, which measures the probability of being an irrigation user with respect to a unit change in an independent variable, was calculated using the mfx stata command.
The relationship between technology adoption and household age (Headage) has remained mixed. This result is in line with the published literature. Lapar and Pandey (1999) , for adoption decisions of soil conservation in the Philippines uplands, Baidu-Forson (1999) , regarding the adoption of land-enhancing technology in the Sahel; Fufa and Has-san (2006) and Chirwa (2005) , in terms of fertiliser adoption in Ethiopia and hybrid seed for Malawi respectively, found negative relationships. This implies that, as farmers grow older, they become more risk averse and less willing to adopt new farming technologies. On the other hand, Polson and Spencer (1991) and Abay and Admassie (2004) found positive relationships between age and improved cassava variety adoption in Nigeria and chemical fertiliser adoption in Ethiopia respectively. Age when taken as proxy for farm experience (human capital theory) will be positive; but older farmers with a very short planning horizon and high risk averse age can be negatively associated with technology adoption (Zepeda, 1990) . Hence, the sign of the household level) and positive. This is again consistent with our expectation. Developing an irrigation scheme as well as irrigable labour market, farmers are dependent on their family labour.
Contact with extension services gives farmers greater access to information on technology, via communications and more opportunities to participate in demonstration tests. Accordingly, access to extension services (captured by the number of visits by an extension agent) showed a positive -positive relationship between extension service and farmers'
Credit is very important in that it helps farmers to acquire all the necessary inputs in the right quantities and qualities at the right time. However, when are farmers are credit constrained, consistent with our expectation, they were among Similar results were also reported by He et al. (2007) and Deressa et al. (2009) .
Finally, having access to farmer-to-farmer extension (the existence of a neighbour adopter) increased the likelihood of using one of the irrigation schemes by 41 per cent, consistent with our expectation. Similar results were reported by Deressa et al (2009) . 
Welfare estimation results
2004)
, as compared to the alternative two-step procedure correlation between the irrigation adoption decision and the household income ( 1cY ) for regime 1 and household asset formation ( 2cF ) for regime 2 are statistically different from zero (Table 3 ). The results suggest that both observed and -fare equation indicates that self-selection occurred in the participation of irrigation schemes. The differences in the between the farm households of those participating in irrigation schemes and those not participating illustrate the presence of heterogeneity in the sample.
An important question is whether farm households that -mating impact of adoption). The results, obtained using equations (12)- (16), are presented in Table 4 . The observed households who adopt and do not adopt was 0.145 ((a)-(b) in Table 4 ) and 0.898 ((e)-(f) in Table 4 ) respectively. However, this simple comparison is misleading because it does not account for other unobserved factors that may have impacted the two outcome variables (households' income Hence, to account for the potential unobservable effect on the outcome variable column [3] is included which 4 and gives the differences in (Carter and Milon, 2005) . With the counterfactual condition that, the adopters placed in the non-adopters status BH 1Y and BH 1F in Table 4 ; the households would be expected to earn assets on average. Similarly, with the counterfactual condition that the non-adopter households adopt irrigation BH 0Y and BH 0F in Table 4 and equation (15), the households would earn more income (0.061) but own less asset (-0.053). Under both counterfactual conditions, irrigation using households perform better (with the exception of BH 2F ) than non-irriga-4 -tions (14)- (16). sources of variation between the two groups that could not be fully captured by the observable variables in the model does not explain households' performance in the two out- Table 4 column [3] presents the treatment effects of irrivalue for a randomly-selected household in each group. For in column [3] measures that the mean effect of access to irrigation (TT in equation (12)) was an increase of 0.084 point our outcome variables are expressed in natural logarithm it represents 8.8 per cent for income and 186 per cent for asset formation. This implies that participation in the micro-irrigation programme has a positive effect on household welfare in the research area. Similarly, the households without access to irrigation were placed into the status of with access (TU in equation (13)); the implication would be a mean decrease -tion (0.184 points). Access to irrigation effects is larger for irrigation user households, resulting in a positive value for the transitional heterogeneity effect (equation (16), Table 4 ). The estimated treatment effects portray that, except in one case, access to irrigation places households in a better welTo check the robustness of our results, we estimate alter--butional assumptions: propensity score matching (PSM) and OLS for each regime (Table 4 ). The results were very similar the one hand and PSM and OLS on the other hand. The PSM, which estimates based on observables and does not provide consistent estimation of causal effects in the presence of hidden bias, might result in slightly downward estimates for PSM and OLS.
Summary and conclusions
To measure the impact of participation in micro-irrigation development on households' welfare we used an ESR model, which considers selection bias associated with endogeneity of programme participation as well as self-selection often encountered in most programme evaluations. A total of 482 households (195 participants and 287 non-participants) were -sion (whether to use one of the irrigation schemes) was estimated using household and farm characteristics covariates.
have some policy relevance are farmer-to-farmer extension service (neighbour irrigation user) and credit constraints. disseminate information, government should encourage and support farmers' networks, in addition to the conventional extension worker-led extension system. Moreover, to encourage the use of irrigation facilities and thereby improve the income and asset position of rural households, the liquidity constraint should be addressed sustainably, through the provision of micro-credit services.
To capture the impact of the participation on household welfare, two indicators were considered, namely household at market price during the survey period). The results show -tion adoption equation and the outcome equations (income implies that bias would have resulted in the welfare function had it been estimated without correcting for selection bias associated with programme participation in the study.
Furthermore, the empirical results show that the probability of participating in the irrigation programme is associated with farm experience (age as proxy), household level of education, family size and labour force availability in the household, credit constraint and cost of irrigation development. After controlling the selection bias in the estimation process, the different model estimated results showed that participation in the irrigation programme had increased household formation by 186 per cent as compared to non-participants. Given this, we suggest that the government of the Tigray region should extend its support (through extension, access to road and marketing information and credit schemes) so as to increase access to micro-irrigation schemes to other parts of the region and to areas with good ground water potential.
